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Anyone who is satisfied that he or she has a grasp on the criminal
conduct that has been classified as organized crime or has an understanding of the relationship between licit and illicit economies will be stunned
by the long lasting international relationships and sophisticated money
management machinations exposed in Alan A. Block's analysis of
organized crime in The Bahamas. Block proposes that traditional
classifications of crime and criminals into categories such as organized
and white-collar crime are both simplistic and misleading. To demonstrate the validity of this contention, the author provides a meticulously
detailed sociohistorical analysis of the government, business, and legal
development in The Bahamas prior to, during and after decolonization.
He cites names of persons and companies, dates, and details about the
incredibly complex
network that was and continues to be a "serious crime
1
community."
Block does not spend a great deal of time setting out the parameters
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of a more realistic theory of organized crime as it combines with
government, business, and the legal profession on an international basis.
Instead, he focuses on the crime community in The Bahamas to illustrate
his point. This is unfortunate, as his theoretical position represents an
advance beyond the tired and traditional rhetoric describing organized
crime as a singular evil syndicate.
In the past decade the conceptualization of organized crime has
changed considerably. Primarily this has resulted in a horizontal
expansion of the classification to include other, usually ethnic, crime
groups as more or less equal in significance to the Italian Mafia.
Criminologists now include the Chinese Mafia or the Triads, the Japanese
Mafia or the Yakuza, the Colombians, the Jamaicans and the Outlaw
bikers, among others, in their research on organized crime.2 Most
researchers have not, however, made the move to include, as other than
satellite members, criminal groups identified with government or
business. Criminologists have viewed traditional organized criminals as
corrupters, not partners.3 This is not to suggest that white-collar and
corporate crime are being ignored, but rather that the focus is exclusive
rather than inclusive of organized crime.4
Masters of Paradise begins with Block arguing that such crime
classifications as "white-collar" and "organized" crime fail to capture the
quality of the relationships between members of financial and legal
professions on the one hand and what variously has been termed "La
Cosa Nostra" or, more generally, the "Mafia," on the other. He suggests
that examining these activities in isolation distorts the extent to which
criminals designated in one or the other category are in business with
each other. Essentially such divisions focus attention on relatively minor
aspects of the criminal activities engaged in by both groups and draw

2.

HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME (3d ed. 1990).

Abadinsky now devotes

considerable attention to crime groups other than the Mafia active in the United States. See
also JAMES DUBRO, DRAGONS OF CRIME: INSIDE THE ASIAN UNDERWORLD (1992); DAVID
E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: THE EXPLOSIVE ACCOUNT OF JAPAN'S CRIMINAL
UNDERWORLD (1986); YvES LAVIGNE, HELL'S ANGELS: TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS (1987);
ELAINE SHANNON, DESPERADOS:

LATIN DRUG LORDS, U.S. LAWMEN, AND THE WAR

AMERICA CAN'T WIN (1988); CLAIRE STERLING, OCTOPUS: THE LONG REACH OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SICILIAN MAFIA (1990).
3. See DONALD R. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION (1969) (one of the earlier attempts
to focus on the aspects of corruption; government officials and business persons are viewed
as being seduced into cooperation by members of organized crime groups).
4. See, e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE, (1985); John Hagan & Celesta
Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of CriminalInjustice in America, 88 AM. J. Soc.
329 (1982); David Weisburd et al., Class, Status, and the Punishment of White-Collar
Criminals, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 223 (1990) (just a few of the many books and articles
that concentrate on white-collar and corporate crime).
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attention away from their interlocked financial empires. In speaking of
this alliance, Block points out:
Organized criminals, who must operate in the underground economy,
were more eager than most to reap the advantages offered by such
helpful institutional growth. Their natural allies in banking, law, and
accounting not only served their financial needs in the traditional
onshore sense, but offshore became partners with them in the absolute
sense. And that made a difference. So long as their banks and trusts
engaged in financial crimes, including massive tax evasion and the
laundering of illegal monies for organized crime, the owners and
depositors were confederates; this bound the serious crime
community
5
more securely than would otherwise have been the case.
Further, ethnocentric approaches to crime within U.S. borders reduce the
recognition of the truly multinational nature of serious crime communities. 6 Thus Block's analysis of a crime community tied to The Bahamas
serves as a case in point to demonstrate his theory.
Reading between the lines in this study, one is left with the conclusion that what makes a serious criminal community possible is the
involvement of members of government, business, and the legal
profession. Although Block never explicitly makes that point, it is clear
nevertheless. This book is a stark condemnation of the duplicity of
lawyers, not only those who are labelled as "mob" lawyers but also those
whose firms cater to wealthy individuals and corporations. In the
following discussion the development of a serious crime community in
The Bahamas over a thirty year period will be reviewed, the activities of
the Internal Revenue Service relative to investigation and prevention of
criminal activities in the Bahamas will be examined, and some conclusions will be drawn regarding the involvement of the legal and financial
community as they participate in both upper level and underground
economies.

5. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 17-18.

6. While the examination of organized crime on an ethnic group basis recognizes ties
between Italian American groups with Italy or Triads with Hong Kong, and has always
made note of business arrangements in growing and transporting drugs, these associations
are not recognized as criminal communities but rather as links in a chain conspiracy
approach.

Spring 1993]

Masters of Paradise

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SERIOUS CRIME COMMUNITY
IN THE BAHAMAS

As Block explains:
In the Bahamas and nations like it, this role in the "underground
economy" is perhaps their most distinguishing feature. It is so prominent, of course, because it is government policy to provide a haven for
the world wealth no matter who owns it or how their fortunes were
made.7
Block uses the first two chapters of the book to describe how The
Bahamas came to be part of the underground economy. The term
"paradise" is used both generically and specifically in reference to
Paradise Island in The Bahamas and to development companies involved
in questionable financial transactions. Many people envision all islands
in the sun as tranquil escapes from the pressures of the modem-day
world. Perhaps this fantasy had some basis in truth before the presentday pirates brought present-day problems into the picture. The transformation of places like Nassau and Freeport does not, however, prove to be
a simple condemnation of free enterprise and venture capitalism; rather
it demonstrates that greed and power-seeking occur at all levels of
development even though the dollar value of the stakes may change.
In The Bahamas, the story of organized crime, or "organizing crime"
as Block calls it, begins while the territory was still a British Colony.
Block points out in a note that "American organized criminals have
always contributed to the sophisticated criminality rampant in The
Bahamas."8 He goes on to suggest that this pattern emerged in U.S. Civil
War smuggling activities and continued through years during which
prohibition laws were in effect, to the period on which he concentrates
and beyond. This history has been thoughtfully pieced together through
interviews, newspaper accounts, and agency files, in fact using all sources
that could be collected or contacted other than the key criminal community players themselves.9 The documents used, including the Internal
Revenue documents, are available for scholars to examine at Pennsylvania

7. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 103.

8. Id.at 23.
9. In selecting a combination of methods for collection of data for his case study, Block
has achieved triangulation as recommended by Denzin. Denzin has stated that ".

.

. no

single method can ever completely capture all the relevant features of that [empirical]
reality; consequently, sociologists must learn to employ multiple methods in the analysis of
the same empirical events." NORMAN K. DENZIN, THE RESEARCH ACT: A THEORETICAL
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 13 (3d ed. 1989).
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State University.
One difficulty with this study is that reading about the development
of Bahamian criminal activities and financial arrangements gives one the
feeling of being the lone outsider at a multigenerational, extended family
reunion. Each new "relative" introduced to the reader is given a short
introduction to his or her background and how she or he happens to be
attending this reunion. There are so many separate but interrelated
"families" designated by person and company names that it becomes
extremely difficult to follow, particularly as the author assumes that the
reader will remember a character introduced with a group of others in an
earlier discussion. In his effort to include every person and company
involved in the schemes and scams associated with resorts, casinos,
banking and government, Block presents such a mind-boggling amount
of minutia that the total picture sometimes is obscured in the detail.
Essential to understanding the "serious crime community" that is
described in Mastersof Paradiseis that a considerable number of wealthy
upperworld and underworld characters have sought and continue to seek
to find ways to hide, invest, or in other ways conceal money gained both
legally and illegally in order to avoid paying income or capital gains
taxes or face confiscations of money and property.
In the process of engaging in these activities, Bahamian government
officials as well as investment companies, banks and other institutions
made a great deal of money. There were several major companies that
Block traced under a series of names and through a network of shadow
and shell corporations (e.g., Resorts International, Intertel, Devco, among
others) that tie a series of key manipulators to each other and to such
diverse others as Meyer Lansky, Howard Hughes, Donald Trump, Richard
Nixon, Credence Clearwater Revival, and other familiar and not so
familiar names from the underworld, business, entertainment, and
government. Taking this beyond what we have come to expect from
government and business, Block was also able to trace illegal gambling,
drugs and arms deals to the same Bahamian banks and holding companies. While this does not come as a big surprise to those of us who study
crime or even those of us who read the newspaper, the detail that Block
supplies allows us to comprehend at some new level how deeply
imbedded is this second economy in all of our lives. It is also not
surprising that there is so little effort made to suppress or control these
legal and quasi-legal activities which are much more costly to the
economy than those street crimes for which there are endless prosecutions.
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II.

MAJOR COMPANIES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED
SCHEMES AND SCAMS

In later chapters in the book Block traces the dealings of Robert
Vesco at length and follows up on the banking enterprises in The
Bahamas by examining the Castle Bank in detail, under its various names.
In describing Castle, Block has this to say:
Castle was not an organized crime bank in the way that Bank of World
Commerce had been. That bank was formed by racketeers as part of a
complex casino laundering scheme, though it may have had other
purposes as well. Castle was a tax haven first and foremost, formed by
lawyers who had mob connections, and used from time to time to
Its real job covered the panoply of whitelaunder illicit funds ....
collar crime hiding otherwise legitimate profits, aiding in financial
frauds, evading taxes, and investing in various projects for its clientele,
most of whom were not from the ranks of organized crime.10
These chapters serve to illuminate the ongoing processes of money
moving and tax evasion and also to establish even clearer links between
these activities and the serious crime community in The Bahamas.
Although there was some mention of drug money being laundered and
bankrolled in the early days of Bahamian development, most of the
earlier monies came from and went into different sources. In the years
moving into the 1980s the involvement with persons linked to the drug
trade became more and more visible. As the final chapter, "From
Cuckoo's Nest to Cocaine" suggests, major dollars that once came from
the entertainment industry and still flow from gambling skims are today
overshadowed by drug dollars. Block focuses primarily on what law
enforcement personnel designate as La Cosa Nostra and on white-collar
criminals. He does include in later chapters some of the non-traditional,
non-Jewish/Italian organized crime groups such as the Colombian
Medillin Cartel. His discussion of these groups hardly gives a sense of
the vast sums of drug money handled by confidential banking services
outside the U.S. As he has limited his analysis to the period up to the
1980s and to the crime community targeted by the Tradewinds/Haven
operations this is certainly reasonable. However, if readers are to
understand these offshore banking communities they must understand that
more than one crime community is involved and we have little clue as to
the impact of other "Mafias" on the existing crime community that Block
is describing. For example, crime journalist Gerald L. Posner gives some

10.

BLOCK, supra note 1, at 187.
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idea of the business garnered from the North American Chinese Triads.
In referring to the Bahamian connections he says:
Chartered Lear jets leave the United States from major airports and fly
the money in cardboard boxes directly to offshore banks in the Bahamas
or the Dominican Republic. Sometimes so many cartons of cash arrive
that the banks need trucks to transport the shipment from the airport.
U.S. banks are more difficult to use because of a law mandating that
every cash transaction over $10,000 be reported to the Federal government. In a multi-billion-dollar cash business, the $10,000-dollar limit is
like having the average worker report each $1.00 banking transaction."
Some experts on crime appear to be apologists for the involvement
of the lower classes, immigrant groups, or developing countries in
organized criminal activities. They describe crime organizations as
vehicles for these groups to achieve material success that would be
inaccessible to them otherwise. These writers rarely trace the movement
of the economies of entire countries through the same cycles although
there is some hint of this in accounts of the growth of the drug trade in
South and Central American countries.' 2 They also have not been able
to satisfactorily explain the majority of official corruption and whitecollar involvement in affluent countries like the United States.' 3 Block
makes it abundantly clear that white-collar criminality has been effectively hidden by the practice of viewing it apart from organized crime, and
that the criminality of many organized crime figures does not diminish
when they achieve material success or even social acceptability. 14 Bell's
description of American culture as criminogenic and crime as a way of

11. GERALD L. POSNER, WARLORDS OF CRIME: CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES: THE NEW
MAFIA 222 (1988).
12. Recent reports of organized crime in Italy have suggested that these groups account
for approximately 15 per cent of the gross national product in that country as well. See,
e.g., Mafia Poisedfor East Europe, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1992, at Business 7; Richard
Waddington, Italy's Financial War With Mafia Needs Computers Not Guns, REUTER
18, 1991.
13. Abadinsky, however, begins his examination of organized crime with a look at the
history of the "robber barons," of the nineteenth century e.g., John Jacob Astor, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Russell Sage and others. Although he and others recognize
a shift in ethnicity and form during prohibition, they see upperworld and government
NEWSWIRE, July

involvement as preceding the Mafia. HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 59-99 (3d

ed. 1990). Fox traces not only the Mafia but its relationships to upperworld persons like
Joseph Kennedy. STEPHEN Fox, BLOOD AND POWER: ORGANIZED CRIME IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA (1989).
14. Many current organized crime figures are second and third generation Italians
whose parents and grandparents were involved in Mafia activities which suggests that they
are staying in the business rather than leaving it for newer immigrant groups. See Peter
Lupsha, Individual Choice, Material Culture, and Organized Crime, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 3,
18-22 (1981).
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succeeding in the American money economy is the first of a number of
criminal ethnic succession theories posed by organized crime researchers. 5 If we did not see the same kind of organizing criminals in a wide
variety of socioeconomic systems, this kind of explanation would be more
appealing. With the exception of the Italian Mafia and more recently the
Chinese Triads, there has been little attention paid by criminologists to
the international scope of organized crime. In Block's work, which
attends to a crime community that involves government and business as
willing partners, we find only hints at what motivates any of the key
players other than greed. The descriptions of many of the money people
associated with The Bahamas make it appear that the game itself is more
compelling than the results.' 6 The transition from colonial to indigenous
government did not disrupt the money flow or the collusion in the least.
Certainly business and government alike approached deals with the Mafia
as equal partners, sometimes initiating activities and sometimes being
brought in at later stages. Perhaps Jack Katz's theory 7 of the seductiveness of criminal activities, which he developed primarily to explain the
appeal of underclass crime, might be applied to the white-collar and
organized criminals that we find in serious crime communities. Katz has
suggested, in looking at street crimes, that people generate the experience
of being seduced to deviance, cover up by maintaining a normal
appearance, and experience a euphoric thrill by getting away with the
activity.'" His contention is that crime has a sensual attraction and that
ordinary people can achieve a moral transcendence over "the law that
allows them to do crime. Viewing crime as seductive and sensual as well
as easily rationalized offers a possible way of understanding how so many
"law abiding" citizens involve themselves with known criminals in known
criminal activities. While the Bahamian government and other elites
seemingly joined the crime community with little reservation, the book
gives little sense of the feelings of the indigenous people other than those
who took over the governing of the islands after the British.

15. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (rev. ed. 1966).

See also FRANCIS A. J.

IANNI, THE BLACK MAFIA: ETHNIC SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME (1974).

16. Fox describes the excitement as also being important for the underworld figures:
"It was more the excitement than anything else. It was more fun getting the apple than it
was eating it." Fox, supra note 8, at 171
17. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME:
DOING EVIL (1988).

18. Id. at 53.

MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS OF
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III. IRS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE BAHAMAS
Block devotes one chapter to description of the activities of Operation
Tradewinds and several later chapters to the IRS and its follow-up of this
and the subsequent Haven operation. The Tradewinds operation was
devised by the IRS Intelligence Division, and used as agents a well
established American family living in The Bahamas. The Haven project
was a second undercover project that was initiated based on findings from
Tradewinds.
Block details the myriad sweetheart deals, fiduciary malfeasances and
government corruptions that characterized The Bahamas during both the
colonial and indigenous government control periods that these intelligence
operations uncovered, as well as the thoughts and actions of the agents.
Throughout the book he creates, even with the inclusion of massive
documentation, a story that reads very much like one of the current genre
of fact-based spy thrillers.
Given the very limited number of participants that could be designated as heroes in this drama, it is no surprise that Block does not report on
the Tradewinds and Haven undercover operations or their key operatives
from the same critical stance that appears to characterize his reporting on
the "bad guys" from the business, government and organized crime
arenas. He seems to be so enamored with undercover agents Jaffe and
Woodruff that he is able to justify or ignore spying and reporting on
friends, document misappropriation and a number of other questionable
activities used to build cases against the crime community. Although, in
his descriptions of crime community members, he sticks quite close to the
documentation provided by agents' reports, newspaper accounts, and
other identified sources, he occasionally resorts to namecalling, i.e.,
"mobster," "known Mafia associate," "sleazy." The Tradewinds/Project
Haven personnel, however, are described with obvious admiration. They
are presented as heroic underdogs. The operations themselves were
understaffed, underfunded and resisted by the IRS and other agencies.
Block is obviously caught up in this small undercover group's valiant
attempts to beat the overwhelming odds. Everyone appears to be against
them-the governments of both countries, the crime community itself,
and, even more damaging, the various territorial and competing law
enforcement agents and agencies. Little effort is made in this study to
determine who is really victimized and in what ways, or if the existence
and persistence of underground economies speak to some larger problems
in the political economies of developed and developing countries.
Block does consider the colonial and post-colonial exploitation of The
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Bahamas and other Third World countries in several footnotes 19 but even
these comments are paternalistic and patronizing and assume a rightness
of the American government and its agencies while at the same time
demonstrating culpability and incompetence at both the highest and
lowest government levels.
Both in tracing the investors and directors of the various financial and
investment institutions, and in following the trail of the investigations,
there is evidence of bribery and corruption as well as clear government
cooperation in creating legal tax and investment loopholes on the part of
the American as well as the Bahamian governments. Indeed, the entire
book is an indictment of the IRS, particularly under Director Alexander
and his successor. Block views Alexander's egregious policies as
exacerbating tax evasion and money laundering problems and supporting
the already positive tax haven environment. The most visible victims are
the law-abiding taxpayers, if one discounts the assumed victimization of
those who are robbed in get-rich-quick schemes or in trying to avoid
paying taxes. It is difficult to muster up much sympathy for these
groups. One does feel sorry, however, in the context of Block's
presentation, for the agent who spearheaded the undercover operation and
who was ultimately relieved of his duties and even tried. What seems to
slip by unnoticed are the number of agents such as "Special Agent
Wallace Musoff (later to represent the [New York] Purple gang after
leaving the IRS) . . ." who went over to the other side.2"

For those

people who seem to have changed sides during the course of the case
study, Block simply notes the fact but does not search for a pattern. In
documenting the rise and fall of this undercover operation, Block tends
to take a pro law enforcement position. He recognizes that the highest
levels of government, such as former President Nixon and the heads of
the Internal Revenue Service seem to be working against the undercover
operation, but he does not question the tax laws themselves nor give any
credence to the possibility that the Tradewinds agents may have been
compromised.
Although there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Agent Jaffe and
his people, it is difficult to credit the Internal Revenue Service with
mounting a sincere effort to control the crime community that operates
out of The Bahamas with apparent impunity. Other than accepting a
blatant paternalism that suggests that the U.S. indeed knows what is best
for Bahamians, it is difficult to comprehend why anyone should expect

19. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 24.

20. Id at 111.
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The Bahamas to do better than the U.S. in controlling this crime
community under which Bahamians have achieved considerable prosperity. If the reader accepts Block's assessment of the ways in which the
various U.S. law enforcement agencies have operated, and there is no
reason to doubt that his assessments are accurate after reading his book,
one of the few successful or potentially successful operations aimed at
bringing members of a crime community to justice was sabotaged and its
driving force was punished. This would offer little hope that the IRS is
going to be able to outsmart or outmaneuver the serious crime communities in The Bahamas or elsewhere or that this is a serious goal.
IV. THE LEGAL AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONS
In viewing IRS efforts to apprehend tax evaders, everywhere one
turns one finds legal and moral dilemmas. Readers have to wonder,
"How do we get other governments to play by our rules?" "How do we
know that our rules are the right ones?" and "What does it suggest when
we find that in the war between money and morality, morality seems to
lose every time?" Certainly there is little evidence that there has been a
serious effort on the part of any branch of the United States government
to contain overseas tax evasion and money sheltering activities.
Throughout Masters of Paradise,one cannot help but be struck by
the overt and covert involvement of the financial and legal professions.
Block quotes "a California-based tax attorney ... under investigation by
the IRS for masterminding an elaborate offshore tax scam for scores of
wealthy clients," as saying:
There is nothing more corrupting to our society than a system of
taxation .... He (the taxpayer) puts money in a Bahama central trust.
Why in the Bahamas? There is no income or estate tax in the Bahamas
...

He takes losses and deductions in the United States and he takes

gains and profits abroad, under a tax treaty. Do you think any Congress
we have is going to change the laws that allow this? ...

With those

savings, the
rich of this country can afford to buy the entire Senate, if
2
necessary. '
Without condemning specific existing tax laws, there seems to be
something intrinsically wrong when there are different standards of
morality and legality for different groups in society. On page after page
of this book there are references to the involvements of members of the
legal profession. It does not appear that the internal policing by the
profession is effective. While the reader does not want to judge the

21. Id. at 274.
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entire profession by those who violate the ethical standards, it is clear that
too many lawyers are involved not as defenders but as major players. By
attending to the significant involvement of lawyers, bankers, investment
and accounting firms, as well as organized crime figures, Block makes an
arresting case for reconceptualizing how members of society are labelled
as criminals and punished for their criminal activities.
By linking key figures in government, as well as respected law and
business firms, to organized crime figures, he demonstrates how
inconsistently we respond to criminality in different segments of society
and how inconsistently we punish offenders. Tax and corporate lawyers
seem to regard it as their duty to help their clients to retain and in*crease
their assets (and the lawyers' assets as well). Does this expectation for
service to wealthy clients in some way contradict the intent of taxation
legislation which purports to share the burden of government? Block
does not deal with this question nor examine the benefits or liabilities of
second economies but these are issues that need to be considered. These
questions need thorough examination by the legal and financial communities.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Alan Block, in Masters of Paradise,has demonstrated the power of
the crime community and forces us to rethink our understandings of
organized and white-collar crime. In showing that he, as a researcher
using existing information, is able to untangle and document the criminal
network and successful tax evasions of a large number of known
organized crime figures and their "non-criminal" associates, Block writes
a powerful condemnation of the existing social controls for these types
of criminal activities. The handling of the Tradewinds and Haven
Projects by the Internal Revenue Service makes a mockery of the degree
to which the wealthy of this country are required to pay taxes. Certainly
the initial support and the subsequent destruction of this effort suggests
a lack of commitment on the part of the IRS to seriously enforce tax laws
on those most able to pay. (On the other hand, do we, in a free and
democratic society, need yet another secret police agency such as the IRS
Intelligence Division to gather information on the activities of citizens?)
Most people are aware that since the FBI convicted Al Capone on an
income tax evasion charge, tax evasion laws and the newer and more
wide range Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (18 U.S.C.
Sections 1961-68), better known as RICO, statutes have been virtually the
only way that organized crime figures have been convicted and impris-
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oned. 22 We are also aware that white-collar criminals have been caught
and penalized under security trading or banking regulations. Existing
laws enforced by existing law enforcement agents could be sufficient.
We must ask ourselves how much the United States can and should be
able to control or violate laws of other countries and under what
circumstances. Many offshore banking laws are created to provide tax
havens-to evade U.S. tax laws. However, this has been the case for
many years in some European banking communities. Can we deal with
impoverished island communities in different ways than we deal with
established European communities? If international regulating is required,
should it not then be done through international negotiations which
recognize equal sovereignty of all nations? Grassi23 suggests that
countries must organize themselves to combat international organized
crime. He believes that at the present time there are neither legislative
nor judicial ways to deal with international crime and that simple
information exchange and extradition will not resolve the problem.
Masters of Paradise is a well-documented and fascinating study
detailing the merger of international business, government and organized
crime in one island community. The fact that this is only one small
example of a serious international crime community and that American
control agencies' efforts to bring members of this crime community to
justice were largely ineffective, should alert readers to serious problems
in containing the growth of criminally dominated second economies.
Block's work abruptly departs from the limited focus of researchers and
citizens alike on old geographically, socially and ethnically limited
visions of organized crime. For too many years the focus on organized
crime as distinct from white-collar crime has diverted attention away from
crimes of the rich and towards a convenient scapegoat.
We are still too willing to believe in the integrity of government and
professional communities that are intrinsically involved in damaging
criminal activities. Perhaps Block's work will refocus attention away
from crime in the streets and onto serious crime communities composed
of organized crime, government and their financial and legal partners.
Whether or not it has this effect, the book is an interesting study and well
worth reading.

22. However, the existing Internal Revenue Code, Conspiracy Laws, or Drug Laws, and

certainly the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1988)) have
all been used in organized crime cases as well.
23. Aldo Grassi, The Role of the Courts in Combatting Organized Crime, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZED CRIME 37-47 (Jane Roe Buckwalter ed.,

1990).

